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Abstract
As noted by Wesley Salmon and many others, causal concepts are ubiquitous in every branch of
theoretical science, in the practical disciplines and in everyday life. In the theoretical and practical
sciences especially, people often base claims about causal relations on applications of statistical
methods to data. However, the source and type of data place important constraints on the choice
of statistical methods as well as on the warrant attributed to the causal claims based on the use of
such methods. For example, much of the data used by people interested in making causal claims
come from non-experimental, observational studies in which random allocations to treatment and
control groups are not present. Thus, one of the most important problems in the social and health
sciences concerns making justified causal inferences using non-experimental, observational data. In
this paper, I examine one method of justifying such inferences that is especially widespread in
epidemiology and the health sciences generally – the use of causal criteria. I argue that while the
use of causal criteria is not appropriate for either deductive or inductive inferences, they do have
an important role to play in inferences to the best explanation. As such, causal criteria, exemplified
by what Bradford Hill referred to as "aspects of [statistical] associations", have an indispensible part
to play in the goal of making justified causal claims.
Introduction
As noted by Salmon [1] and others [2,3], causal concepts
are ubiquitous in every branch of theoretical science, in
the practical disciplines and in everyday life. In the case of
the social sciences, Marini and Singer write that "the iden-
tification of genuine causes is accorded a high priority
because it is viewed as the basis for understanding social
phenomena and building an explanatory science" [4].
Although health services research is not so interested in
"building an explanatory science", it too, like the social
sciences with which it often overlaps, sets a premium on
identifying genuine causes [5]. Establishing "an argument
of causation is an important research activity," write van
Reekum et al., "because it influences the delivery of good
medical care" [6]. Moreover, given the keen public and
political attention given recently to issues of health care
insurance and health care delivery, a "key question" for
federal, state and local policy makers that falls squarely
within the province of health services research is how
much an effect different kinds of health insurance inter-
ventions have on people's health, "and at what cost" [7].
This focus on causality and causal concepts is also perva-
sive in epidemiology [8-14], with Morabia suggesting that
a name "more closely reflecting" the subject matter of epi-
demiology is "'population health etiology', etiology
meaning 'science of causation"' [15]. For example, Swaen
and Amelsvoort write that one "of the main objectives of
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epidemiological research is to identify causes of diseases"
[16], while Botti, et al. write that a "central issue in envi-
ronmental epidemiology is the evaluation of the causal
nature of reported associations between exposure to
defined environmental agents and the occurrence of dis-
ease. [17]" Gori writes that epidemiologists "have long
pressed the claim that their study belongs to the natural
sciences ... [and seek] to develop theoretical models and
to identify experimentally the causal relationships that
may confirm, extend, or negate such models" [18], and
Oswald even goes so far as to claim that epidemiologists
are "obsessed with cause and effect. [19]" Of course, it is
true that some writers [20] are a bit more cautious when
describing how considerations of causality fit into the
goals of epidemiology. Weed writes that the "purpose of
epidemiology is not to prove cause-effect relationships ...
[but rather] to acquire knowledge about the determinants
and distributions of disease and to apply that knowledge
to improve public health. [21]" Even here, though, what
seems implicit is that establishing cause-and-effect rela-
tionships is still the ideal goal of epidemiology, and as
Weed himself writes in a later publication, finding "a
cause, removing it, and reducing the incidence and mor-
tality of subsequent disease in populations are hallmarks
of public health and practice" [22].
Often people base claims about the existence and strength
of causal relations on applications of statistical methods
to data. However, the source and type of data place impor-
tant constraints on the choice of statistical methods as
well as on the warrant attributed to the causal claims
based on the use of such methods [23]. In this context,
Urbach writes that an "ever-present danger in ... investiga-
tions is attributing the outcome of an experiment to the
treatment one is interested in when, in reality, it was
caused by some extraneous variation in the experimental
conditions" [24]. Expressed in a counterfactual frame-
work, the danger is that while the causal contrast we want
to measure is that between a target population under one
exposure and, counterfactually, that same population
under a different exposure, the observable substitute we
use for the target population under the counterfactual
condition may be an imperfect substitute [25,26]. When
the observable substitute is an imperfect substitute for the
target population under the counterfactual condition, the
result is confounding, and the measure of the causal con-
trast is confounded. In order to address this "ever-present
danger", many users of statistical methods, especially
those of the Neyman-Pearson or Fisher type [27,28],
claim that randomization is necessary.
Ideally, what randomization (random allocation to treat-
ment and control or comparison groups) does is two-fold.
First, following Greenland, the average of many hypothet-
ical repetitions of a randomized control trial (RCT) will
make "our estimate of the true risk difference statistically
unbiased, in that the statistical expectation (average) of
the estimate over the possible results equals the true
value" [29]. In other words, randomization addresses the
problem of statistical bias. However, as pointed out by
Greenland [29], without some additional qualification,
an ideally performed RCT does not "prevent the epidemi-
ologic bias known as confounding" [29]. To reduce the
probability of confounding, idealized random allocation
must be used to create sufficiently large comparison
groups. As Greenland notes, by using "randomization,
one can make the probability of severe confounding as
small as one likes by increasing the size of the treatment
cohorts" [29]. For example, using the example in Green-
land, Robins and Pearl, suppose that "our objective is to
determine the effect of applying a treatment or exposure
x1 on a parameter μ of the distribution of the outcome y
in population A, relative to applying treatment or expo-
sure x0" [30]. Further, let us suppose that "μ will equal μA1
if x1 is applied to population A, and will equal μA0 if x0 is
applied to that population" [30]. In this case, we can
measure the causal effect of x1 relative to x0 by μA1-μA0.
However, we cannot apply both x1 and x0 to the same pop-
ulation. Thus, if A is the target population, what we need
is some population B for which μB1 is known to equal (has
a high likelihood of equaling) μA1, and some population
C for which μC0 is known to equal (has a high likelihood
of equaling) μA0. To create these two groups, we randomly
sample from A. If the randomization is ideal and the treat-
ment cohorts (B and C) are sufficiently large, then we can
expect, in probability, that the outcome in B would be the
outcome if everyone in A were exposed to x1, while the
outcome in C would be the outcome if everyone in A were
exposed to x0. Thus, what idealized randomization does,
when the treatment cohorts created by random selection
from the target population are sufficiently large, is to cre-
ate two sample populations that are exchangeable with A
under their respective treatments (x1 and x0). In this way,
a sufficiently large, perfectly conducted RCT controls for
confounding, in probability, because the randomized
allocation into B and C is, in effect, random sampling
from the target population A to create reference popula-
tions B and C that are exchangeable with A. As Hernán
notes, in "ideal randomized experiments, association is
causation" [31].
Hernán's claim that in idealized randomized experiments,
"association is causation", is a contemporary restatement
of a view presented earlier by the English statistician and
geneticist R. A. Fisher. According to Fisher, "to justify the
conclusions of the theory of estimation, and the tests of
significance as applied to counts or measures arising in
the real world, it is logically necessary that they too must
be the results of a random process" [32]. It is this conten-
tion, captured succinctly by Hernán, that is the center-Epidemiologic Perspectives & Innovations 2009, 6:2 http://www.epi-perspectives.com/content/6/1/2
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piece of the widely held belief that randomized clinical
trials (RCTs) are, and ought to be, the "gold standard" of
evaluating the causal efficacy of interventions (treat-
ments) [33-36]. Thus, Machin writes that it is likely that
"the single most important contribution to the science of
comparative clinical trials was the recognition more than
50 years ago that patients should be allocated the options
under consideration at random [37]. Similarly, while she
believes that the value of RCTs depends crucially on the
subject matter and the assumptions one is willing to make
[38], Cartwright notes that many evidence-based policies
call for scientific evidence of efficacy before being agreed
to, and that government and other agencies typically
claim that the best evidence for efficacy comes from RCTs
[39].
Although generally considered the gold standard of
research whose goal is to make justified causal inferences,
it should come as no surprise that there is a variety of lim-
itations associated with the use of RCTs. Some of these
limitations are practical. For example, not only are RCTs
typically expensive and time-consuming, there are impor-
tant ethical questions raised when needed resources, that
are otherwise limited or scarce, are randomly allocated.
Similarly, it seems reasonable to worry about the ethical
permissibility of an RCT when its use requires withhold-
ing a potentially beneficial treatment from people who
might otherwise benefit from being recipients of the treat-
ment. In addition to these practical concerns, there is also
a variety of methodological limitations. Even if an ideal-
ized RCT is internally valid, generalizations from it to a
wider population may be very limited. As noted by Silver-
man, a "review of epidemiological data and inclusion and
exclusion criteria for trials of antipsychotic treatments
revealed that only 632 of an estimated 36,000 individuals
with schizophrenia would meet basic eligibility require-
ments for participation in a randomized controlled exper-
iment" [40]. In such cases, even if there are no problems
with differential attrition, the exportation of a finding
from the experimental population to a target population
may well go beyond what is justified by the use of RCTs.
Even more generally, there is no guarantee either that the
observable substitute for the target population under the
counterfactual condition is a "good" substitute, or that a
single RCT will result in a division in which possible con-
founders of the measured outcome are randomly distrib-
uted. Regarding the latter point, Worrall remarks that even
for an impeccably designed and carried out RCT, "all agree
that in any particular case this may produce a division
which is, once we think about it, imbalanced with respect
to some factor that plays a significant role in the outcome
being measured" [41]. While it may be possible to reduce
the probability of such baseline imbalances by multiple
repetitions of the RCT, these repetitions, whose function
is to give the limiting average effect [42], may not be prac-
tically feasible. Moreover, at least when the repetitions are
"real life" repetitions and not computer simulations, there
is no reason to believe that each of the repetitions will be
"ideal", and more reasons to believe that they will not all
be ideal. For this reason, multiple (real life) repetitions of
the RCT are more likely to increase the likelihood of other
kinds of bias, such as differential attrition, not controlled
for by use of an RCT.
Of course there are a variety of approaches that one can
take in attempting to meet these, and other limitations of
RCTs. While not intending to downplay the importance of
RCTs and the attempts to address the limitations associ-
ated with their use, much of the data used by people inter-
ested in making causal claims do not come from
experiments that use random allocation to control and
treatment or comparison groups. Indeed, as Herbert
Smith writes, few "pieces of social research outside of
social psychology are based on experiments" [43]. Thus,
one of the most important problems in the social and
health sciences, as well as in epidemiology, concerns
whether it is possible to make warranted causal claims
using non-experimental, observational data. The focus on
observational data, as opposed to experimental data,
leads us away from RCTs and towards an examination of
what Weed has called the "most familiar component of
the epidemiologist's approach to causal inference", viz.,
"causal criteria" [44]. In the context suggested by the quo-
tation from Weed, the argument presented in this paper
has three parts. First, I argue that, properly understood,
causal inferences that make use of causal criteria, exempli-
fied by the Bradford Hill "criteria", are neither deductive
nor inductive in character. Instead, such inferences are
best understood as instances of what philosophers call
"inference to the best explanation". Second, I argue that
even understood as components of an inference to the
best explanation (the causal claim being the best explana-
tion), causal criteria have many problems, and that the
inferences their use sanctions are, at best, very weak.
Finally, I conclude that while the inferential power of
causal criteria is weak, they still have a pragmatic value;
they are tools, in the toolkits of people interested in mak-
ing causal claims, for preliminary assessments of statisti-
cal associations. To vary a remark by Mazlack about
"association rules", while satisfactions of causal criteria
(such as the Bradford Hill criteria with which this paper
principally deals) do not warrant causal claims, their judi-
cious application is important and, perhaps in many
cases, indispensible for identifying interesting statistical
relationships that can then be subjected to a further, more
analytically rigorous statistical examination [45].
Analysis
Relative to RCTs, the absence of random allocation to
treatment and control or comparison groups is what leadsEpidemiologic Perspectives & Innovations 2009, 6:2 http://www.epi-perspectives.com/content/6/1/2
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to one of, though not all of, the most important method-
ological issues observational, non-experimental studies
face. In the absence of randomized allocations from a suf-
ficiently large population to treatment and control or
comparison groups, we no longer have a probabilistic
guarantee that there is no statistical bias and that we have
minimized the probability of confounding. Thus, because
there is no random allocation in an observational study,
and because, as noted by Little and Rubin, without "a
model for how treatments are assigned to units, formal
causal inference, at least using probabilistic statements, is
impossible" [46], some other method of allocation (and
set of assumptions) is needed for observational studies.
One possibility, according to Little and Rubin, is that
researchers may statistically control for "recorded con-
founders" and then assume, either explicitly or implicitly,
that the non-randomized "treatment assignment corre-
sponds to that of an unconfounded randomized experi-
ment" [46]. A problem with this method is that the
assumption is not testable, and frequently made without
any good theoretical support. Nevertheless, while obser-
vational studies may take a variety of different forms, they
do all share an important characteristic with RCTs; viz., all
those non-statistical aspects of RCTs, apart from their use
of randomized allocation, that go towards making them
well-designed experiments and contribute to causal infer-
ences, are also important in well-designed observational,
non-experimental studies from which causal inferences
are drawn. Put a bit more precisely, any non-statistical
characteristic whose presence is, in the case of RCTs, nec-
essary for a well-founded causal inference to a causal
claim (e.g. compliance to assigned treatments by subjects,
any missing data having the same distribution as observed
data) is also necessary for a well-founded causal inference
in the case of observational, non-experimental studies.
Thus, as William Cochran who, according to Rosenbaum,
was one of the first to present observational studies "as a
topic defined by principles and methods of statistics" [47]
remarks, "to a large extent, workers in observational
research have tried to copy devices that have proved effec-
tive in controlled experiments" [48].
However, suppose that one is not willing to assume that
the non-randomized treatment cohort in an observational
study "corresponds" to the treatment cohort in an uncon-
founded randomized experiment using the same sample
(study) population. In this case, assurances that the non-
statistical characteristics of a well-designed and executed
RCT are also present in the observational study are not
sufficient to make well-founded causal inferences from
the observational data. Something more is needed. It is at
this point that people interested in making well-founded
causal inferences based on observational data differ in
their methodological approaches. One approach is to use
one or more appropriately chosen statistical methods to
model observational data in such a way that the RCT
interventionist method of random allocations into treat-
ment and control or comparison groups is, in one way or
another, captured by the characteristics of the model. This
is the idea behind Rubin's claim that an "observational
study should be conceptualized as a broken randomized
experiment" that we use statistical methods to fix as best
we can [49], and Freedman's similar remark that "one
objective of statistical modeling is to create an analogy,
perhaps forced, between an observational study and an
experiment" [50]. For example, a method widely used in
epidemiology, the social sciences and health services
research to capture observed imbalances in covariate pat-
terns among groups, and so justify inferences that changes
in one or more independent variables cause changes in a
dependent variable, is to use regression models [51,52].
According to Clogg and Haritou, one of the central under-
lying assumptions in what they refer to as the "regression
method of causal inference" is that "experimental manip-
ulation or control through randomization can be replaced
by statistical control or partialing with a regression model,
along with a few assumptions that seem benign to most
researchers" [53]. Whether those "few assumptions" (e.g.
assumptions about functional form, what variables to
include or exclude from the regression equation [54] and
random allocation of treatment within strata for the con-
trolled variables) are genuinely plausible and "benign" in
most real-world situations is a matter of some debate [51].
More recently, propensity score estimation (using regres-
sion as part of the process, but with no attempt to inter-
pret regression coefficients causally) and matching has
emerged as a method to warrant claims about average
causal effects and average causal effects on the treated
[49,55,56]. Introduced by Paul Rosenbaum and David
Rubin in 1983, the propensity score is the conditional
property of a subject/unit in a sample (study) population
being exposed or treated, given a set of observed covari-
ates that one believes predicts the exposure or treatment
[57]. The idea, roughly, is that once we have the estimated
propensity score, we can match "subjects in exposed and
unexposed conditions on their propensity scores" [58].
On the assumption that the matched samples are bal-
anced with respect to the set of observed covariates, and
on the further assumption, questioned by some, that "if
both subjects have the same [estimated] probability of
exposure, it is random which one was in fact exposed and
which was not", we have simulated random allocation
[59]. After this, it is a relatively straightforward exercise to
estimate a causal effect of exposure or treatment [59]. Like
the use of regression models to estimate causal effects, the
use of propensity scores and matching (or some other
methods such as stratification or weighting on the pro-
pensity score) to estimate causal effects makes a number
of assumptions. For example, as suggested above, usingEpidemiologic Perspectives & Innovations 2009, 6:2 http://www.epi-perspectives.com/content/6/1/2
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propensity scores to address problems of statistical bias
and confounding requires assuming that population
members with similar estimated probabilities of exposure
are exchangeable with respect to disease (outcome) fre-
quency. Depending on the observational study, these
assumptions either may be implausible or may place seri-
ous limitations what causal inferences one can justifiably
make [58,59].
There is, to be sure, much to value in approaching ques-
tions of causality in terms of fitting statistically well-
defined models to the available data. In this connection,
Heckman writes that a "major contribution of twentieth
century econometrics was the recognition that causality
and causal parameters are most fruitfully defined within
formal economic models and that comparative statistics
within these models ... most clearly define causal parame-
ters [60]. Similarly, while acknowledging "statistical asso-
ciations do not logically  imply causation," Pearl claims
that under "the assumptions of model minimality (and/
or stability), there are patterns of dependencies that
should be sufficient to uncover genuine causal relation-
ships" [61]. However, at least in the case of observational
studies, not everyone is sanguine about the use of statisti-
cally well-defined models to answer questions about the
presence and relative strength of cause-and-effect relation-
ships. Part of the reticence to embracing statistically based
causal inferences is the worry that these kinds of infer-
ences presuppose that the statistically modeled data are
the products of randomized allocation, while part of the
worry is that statistical modeling, by itself, cannot justify
making causal inferences without the addition of non-sta-
tistically based assumptions. For example, Pearl writes
that in those studies in which there is no random alloca-
tion (what he refers to as "imperfect experiments") "rea-
sonable assumptions about the salient relationships in
the domain" must be used to determine bounds of the
causal effect of an exposure or treatment [61]. Freedman's
criticism of Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines' attempt [62]
to discover causal relationships by the use of directed
graphs to represent statistical independence and depend-
ence relationships between variables used in the graph
makes an analogous point. According to Freedman, while
the use of directed graphs and the associated algorithms
by Sprites, Glymour and Scheines has "some technical
interest", they will justify drawing causal inferences "only
when causation is assumed in the first place" [63]. Put a
bit more charitably, unless there are independent reasons
for believing that statistical associations are causal rela-
tions, there is no justification, using only these kinds of
statistical models, to infer that the statistical associations
are causal relations.
For these reasons (and there is no implication intended
here that these exhaust the reasons), a second approach
for justifying causal inferences, and so warranting the
causal claims based on those inferences, has developed.
This approach, often adopted independently of the statis-
tically based approach to justifying causal inferences,
focuses on identifying and describing the conditions that
must be satisfied in order for the belief, that a statistical
association between two events is a causal relationship, to
be a justified (warranted) belief. Although Susser refers to
this as a strategy in which "making inferences about
causes" depends on the "subjective judgment" of the per-
son making the judgment [64], this is not an altogether
fair characterization. As has already been noted,
approaching the problems posed by causal inference
using statistical models and estimating causal parameters
within those models requires making a variety of assump-
tions and so inevitably involves "subjective judgment".
Subjective judgments are ubiquitous in any account of
causal inference, and so is not a characteristic that permits
distinguishing formal, statistically based causal inferences
from causal inferences based on some other approach.
Instead, what distinguishes the conditions-based
approach is precisely the idea that a statistical association
is a causal relation just in case that association satisfies
some set of criteria that is neither reducible to, nor elimi-
nable in favor of the specification of some set of formal
statistical models of the statistical association. Thus,
Greenland characterizes this approach as one not based
"on a formal causal model", and refers to it as the "canon-
ical approach" since it "usually leaves terms like 'cause'
and 'effect' as primitives ... around which ... self-evident
canons [criteria] are built, much like axioms are built
around the primitives of 'set' and 'is an element of' in
mathematics" [65]. Historically, the "canonical
approach" is evidenced in the 1964 Surgeon General's
report on the dangers of smoking. According to the
Report:
Statistical methods cannot establish proof of a causal
relationship in an association. The causal significance
of the association is a matter of judgment which goes
beyond any statement of statistical probability [66].
In effect, the Report is stating that no formal statistical
modeling of the data can, without additional, non-statis-
tical assumptions, justify drawing a causal inference (and
so drawing a warranted causal claim) from any statistical
associations that are present. Because of this limitation of
statistical modeling, the Report goes on to state that to
"judge or evaluate the causal significance of the associa-
tion between the attribute or agent and disease, or effect
upon health, a number of criteria must be utilized, no one
of which is an all-sufficient basis for judgment" [66]. The
criteria used in the Report were the consistency, strength,
specificity, temporal relationship, and coherence of the
association.Epidemiologic Perspectives & Innovations 2009, 6:2 http://www.epi-perspectives.com/content/6/1/2
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Following the publication of the Surgeon General's
Report, Austin Bradford Hill, in his 1965 Presidential
Address to the Section of Occupational Medicine of the
Royal Society of Medicine, asked under what circum-
stances we can justifiably pass from "an observed associa-
tion  to a verdict of causation" [67]. In answer to this
question, Bradford Hill recommended the use of the five
criteria present in the Surgeon General's Report, and
added four others, viz., biological gradient, plausibility,
experiment and analogy [67]. Although he described the
circumstances whose presence permitted passing from an
observed observation to a verdict of causation as "aspects
of [a statistical] association" we should "consider before
deciding that the most likely interpretation of it is causa-
tion" [67], the resulting nine criteria are now typically
referred to as the "Bradford Hill Criteria" for causal infer-
ences. It is true that writers such as Phillips and Goodman
object to calling Bradford Hill's aspects of association "cri-
teria", preferring instead the locution "causal considera-
tions" [68], but they also concede that what Bradford Hill
proposed is "frequently taught to students in epidemiol-
ogy and referred to in the literature as 'causal criteria"'
[69]. Moreover, while commonly used in epidemiology
and the health sciences since 1965 as a "central tool for
the epidemiological community in grappling with the
broader issues of causal reasoning" [70], the "basic out-
line of the modern set of criteria has," according to
Kaufman and Poole, "evolved little" since their formula-
tion by the Surgeon General's Advisory Committee and
Bradford Hill [70].
There are many examples of studies that use the Bradford
Hill criteria (or some subset of the criteria) in an attempt
to justify causal inferences. One clear and publicly acces-
sible example of their use is on the Website of the SV40
Cancer Foundation. There, Horwin applies "what was
published in the peer-reviewed medical literature to the
nine Bradford Hill criteria in respect to medulloblastoma
and other brain cancers" to demonstrate the causal effi-
cacy of SV40 [71]. In addition, the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency's 2005 "Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk
Assessment", also publicly accessible, explicitly recom-
mends the use of the Bradford Hill criteria to assess
whether an observed statistical association is causal rather
than spurious [72]. There are many more examples of
applications of the Bradford Hill criteria that appear in
academic journals covering a range of disciplines. These
examples include, but are not limited to, determining
whether chrysotile asbestos causes mesothelioma [73],
determining whether second generation antipsychotic
drugs cause diabetes [74], evaluating the effects of "envi-
ronmental carcinogens" [75], evaluating whether abuse
experienced as a child or as an adolescent/adult is causally
related to urologic symptoms [76], and evaluating causal
associations in pharmacovigilance as well as pharmacoep-
idemiology [77,78]. The Bradford Hill criteria have even
been applied to studies in molecular epidemiology [79],
as well as to when searching "for the true effectiveness" of
dental health care services in facilitating "recovery from an
oral health-related decrement in quality of life called 'oral
disadvantage due to disease and tissue damage'. [80]"
Overall, regardless of the specific discipline in which the
study occurred, the most common use of the Bradford Hill
criteria when investigating whether a statistical associa-
tion is a causal relationship (e.g. the statistical association
between genital ulcer disease and the transmission of
human immunodeficiency virus [81]) is to apply them to
evidence presented in reviewed literature [73,74,81-87].
Based on their widespread use, it is not surprising that
some form of Bradford Hill's causal criteria are, according
to Weed, "arguably the most commonly-used method of
interpreting scientific evidence in public health" [88], and
that, according to Parascandola, the Bradford Hill criteria
are "routinely cited as authoritative statements of the
proper method for assessing a body of etiological evi-
dence" [89]. Indeed, Shakir and Layton even go so far as
to write that Bradford Hill's Presidential Address, in which
the nine criteria ("aspects of association") were identified
and described, was one "of the most important papers
published in the 20th century with thoughts on the epide-
miological basis of disease causation" [77]. Still, just as
the popular consent to a belief does not make that belief
true, so too, the widespread acceptance and use of Brad-
ford Hill criteria does not entail that their use truly justi-
fies causal inferences. Thus, we need to examine, carefully
and critically, the Bradford Hill criteria to determine pre-
cisely what their function is, if any, in justifying causal
inferences.
The first thing to keep in mind is that 'inference' has at
least two meanings that it is important not to conflate.
The first meaning of 'inference' is the psychological activ-
ity of accepting a conclusion based on one or more other
beliefs held to be true. For example, when consumer psy-
chologists study under what circumstances consumers
generalize from specific information to general conclu-
sions, or construe specific conclusions from general prin-
ciples or assumptions [90], they are studying inference as
a psychological activity. It is this sense of inference that is
important when characterizing rationality [91]. The sec-
ond meaning of 'inference' is about logical permissibility;
it refers to whether one is logically permitted to assert that
a particular claim is true because of its evidential relation-
ship to one or more other claims (hypothetically)
accepted as true. Here the focus is not on the psychology
of people engaged in reasoning, but on the relationship
between evidence (claims held true) and a claim asserted
to be true. When applying Bradford Hill criteria to causal
inferences (inferences having a causal claim as a conclu-Epidemiologic Perspectives & Innovations 2009, 6:2 http://www.epi-perspectives.com/content/6/1/2
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sion), it is the second meaning of 'inference' that is rele-
vant, not the first. In other words, inference, in the context
of applications of Bradford Hill criteria, does not refer to
the psychological activity of "transitioning" (reasoning)
from a set of beliefs to another belief, but instead refers to
the kind of evidential relationship that exists between a
claim (e.g. a causal claim such as "X causes Y") and the evi-
dence for that claim.
Typically, evidential relationships between evidence held
true (the premises) and a claim asserted to be true (the
conclusion) because of the evidence are characterized as
either deductive or inductive. In the first case, if the deduc-
tive relationship is a valid one, then the truth of the evi-
dence guarantees that the asserted claim, the conclusion,
is true. Again, it is important to emphasize here that this
is a claim about logical implication, not about reasoning.
As noted by Harman, it is "an interesting and nontrivial
problem to say just how deductions are relevant to reason-
ing," but it is an interesting and nontrivial problem just
because deductive relationships are not instances of rea-
soning [92]. In the second case, if the inductive relation-
ship is a strong one, then, following Skyrms, "it is
improbable, given that the premises [evidence presented
in the form of statements] are true, that the conclusion is
false" [93]. Thus, in the case of the inductive relationship,
the evidence presented by the premises underdetermines
the truth-value of the conclusion. Once again, though,
this is a claim about the character and limits of logical
inference, not reasoning.
To the extent that we are willing to model evidential
claims and claims that constitute the conclusions of
deductive implications in formal logical systems, it is pos-
sible to give system-relative, precise syntactic and seman-
tic characterizations of the concept of deductive validity.
For example, suppose that A1...An-1, An is a sequence of
well-formulated formulae in a formalized logical lan-
guage L, where A1...An-1 are the premises and An is the con-
clusion. We can then say that A1...An-1, An is (syntactically)
valid in L "just in case An is derivable from A1...An-1, and
the axioms of L, if any, by the rules of inference of L" [94].
Analogously, we can say that A1...An-1, An is (semantically)
valid in L "just in case An is true in all interpretations
[models] in which A1...An-1 are true" [94]. Of course, this
kind of technical sophistication raises an immediate prob-
lem if one believes that satisfactions of Bradford Hill cri-
teria are deductively related to a causal claim. The
instances of criteria satisfaction, as well as the causal claim
functioning as the conclusion, must be "appropriate"
instantiations of well-formed formulae in a formalized
logical language L. However, except for small, artificially
regimented fragments of natural languages, the project of
modeling complex natural languages into an underlying
formalized logical language (a problem in logic, not lin-
guistics [95]) has met with mixed success and no consen-
sus. The point, then, is that if one holds that satisfactions
of the Bradford Hill criteria (validly) deductively support
a causal claim, it seems unlikely that it is this highly for-
malized conception of deductive validity that is at work.
Still, perhaps one could try to use a more informal charac-
terization of a valid deductive inference and say that as
long as all the Bradford Hill criteria were satisfied in some
acceptable way, they would guarantee the truth of the
causal claim. However, by giving up the formalized con-
ception of deductive validity, we have also given up the
utility of this more loosely characterized sense of deduc-
tive validity. To see why, suppose we let B1...B9 represent
each of the Bradford Hill criteria, and suppose that C rep-
resents the causal claim. On the more informally charac-
terized sense of deductive validity, we want to say that on
a non-formal construal of the criteria that permits us to
determine whether each of the nine criteria are satisfied,
and so true, if each of B1...B9 is true, then C must be true
as well. It is not enough to say simply that C is true (as
opposed to must be true), since C could be true for rea-
sons that have nothing to do with each of or all of B1...B9.
However, what is it about each of or all of B1...B9 being
true that necessitates C being true? It cannot be because of
the syntactic characteristics of well-formed formulae in a
formalized logical language since we have already given
up this characterization of deductive validity. Impor-
tantly, it also cannot be because every model in which
each of the B's in B1...B9 is true, is also a model in which C
is true, since the specification of models requires adopting
the formalized conception of validity [96] that we have
given up. Thus, there is no useful sense in which the truth
of a causal claim can be "clinched", deductively, by the
satisfaction of the Bradford Hill criteria.
Now, implicit in the discussion to this point is the
assumption that the relationship between the Bradford
Hill criteria and a causal claim is that if the criteria are all
satisfied, then the causal claim is true. This is an argument
structure known as affirming the antecedent (modus pon-
ens), and captures the idea that the satisfaction of the
Bradford Hill criteria confirms the truth of the causal
claim. However, instead of using this argument structure,
we could adopt a broadly Popperian perspective and,
instead, use the argument structure of denying the conse-
quent (modus tollens) [97]. If we do this, we have moved
from a deductivist account of confirmation to a deductiv-
ist account of falsification. By doing this, we could say that
what matters is not whether the Bradford Hill criteria are
satisfied, but whether the criteria are not satisfied. In other
words, our argument now has the form that if a particular
causal claim, C, is true, then the Bradford Hill criteria,
B1...B9, are satisfied, and if it is not the case that B1...B9 are
satisfied, then C is false. Rather than finding out whatEpidemiologic Perspectives & Innovations 2009, 6:2 http://www.epi-perspectives.com/content/6/1/2
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causal claims are true, by falsifying the Bradford Hill crite-
ria (i.e., by finding that it is not the case that the Bradford
Hill criteria are satisfied), we discover which causal claims
are false.
However, right away there are problems. First, the expres-
sion "it is not the case that B1...B9 are satisfied" is ambigu-
ous. It could mean either that none of the B1...B9 are
satisfied, or that at least one of the B1...B9 is not satisfied.
The former seems an unlikely interpretation since one of
the Bradford Hill criteria is that in a cause-effect relation-
ship, the cause temporally precedes the effect. Arguably,
for almost all cases of cause-and-effect relationships in
epidemiology, health services research and the social sci-
ences, this will be true [22,88]. Thus, for all but the most
extraordinary cases, at least one of the B1...B9 is satisfied,
thereby undermining the deductive inference that the
causal claim, C, is false. Second, recall that one of the
Bradford Hill criteria is strength of analogy. Analogies are
inductive arguments, and so vary along a continuum in
terms of their strength [98]. It follows from this that the B
in B1...B9 that corresponds to the Bradford Hill criteria of
analogy will never be entirely satisfied (unless the analogy
is actually an identity) and never entirely dissatisfied
(unless there are absolutely no shared properties or char-
acteristics). If we count any degree of satisfaction as suffi-
cient for purposes of claiming that the criterion is
satisfied, then we have a problem analogous to that posed
by the criterion of the cause preceding the effect. If we try
to set some threshold limit for satisfaction, then the
assessment of whether the criterion is satisfied seems ad
hoc.
All this would seem to lead to saying that "it is not the case
that B1...B9 are satisfied" means that there is some proper
subset of B1...B9 none of whose members is satisfied.
However, this leads to the possibility of very different
assessments of the same causal claim. For example, sup-
pose that the causal claim in question is C, and one per-
son claims that the relevant conditional in the
falsificationist inference is "If C then B1...B3", while
another person claims that the relevant conditional is "If
C then B4...B9". Further, suppose that each of B1...B3 is
false while none of B4...B9 is false. In this case, the first per-
son concludes that the causal claim, C, is false, while the
second person claims that there is no justifiable reason to
hold that the causal claim is false (and may, in fact, hold
the causal claim to be true because it has not been falsi-
fied). Although not strictly inconsistent with one another
(the failure to falsify a claim does not entail that the claim
is true), the two claims are quite different and, at least in
a public health context, could lead to the adoption of very
different policies. One obvious way to resolve the dispute
would be to provide some kind of justification that sup-
ports the use of one of the proper subsets of Bradford Hill
criteria but not the other. This tact, though, raises its own
problems. First, the problem is not simply that we have to
choose between two contenders. What we must do is to
choose amongst all possible contenders (e.g. there is also
the contender of B3...B5). Second, what kind of justifica-
tion would suffice for choosing one proper subset of Brad-
ford Hill criteria instead of another? The aim of the
Bradford Hill criteria, on the falsificationist deductivist
account, was to permit us to exclude causal claims as false.
Now, though, it appears that we need criteria for the crite-
ria, and that we need to specify the relationship (possibly
deductive, though this seems to raise the same problems
all over again) of those new criteria to the Bradford Hill
criteria that we want to retain. Thus, treating "it is not the
case that B1...B9 are satisfied" as meaning that there is
some proper subset of B1...B9, none of whose members is
satisfied, seems to be no resolution to the problems asso-
ciated with treating the relationship between the Bradford
Hill criteria and a causal claim as one of deductive entail-
ment.
Finally, and more broadly, regardless of the interpretation
given to the expression "it is not the case that B1...B9 are
satisfied", there seem to be problems associated with
interpreting the criteria themselves since, as Rothman et
al. claim, there are ambiguities, fallacies and vagaries in
each of the Bradford Hill criteria [99,100]. For example,
regarding the criterion of analogy, Rothman et al. write
that whatever "insight might be derived from analogy is
handicapped by the inventive imagination of scientists
who can find analogies everywhere. At best, analogy pro-
vides a source of more elaborate hypotheses about the
associations under study; absence of such analogies only
reflects lack of imagination or experience, not falsity of the
hypothesis" [100]. They conclude, based on similar kinds
of analyses of the other eight Bradford Hill criteria, that
"the standards of epidemiologic evidence offered by Hill
are saddled with reservations and exceptions" [100].
When considered in toto, these sorts of problems with
treating the relationship between a causal claim and satis-
factions of the Bradford Hill criteria as either a confirma-
tionist or a falsificationist deductive relationship support
the view that we need to find a different account of the
relationship.
As noted earlier, the typical division of logical inferences
is into deductive and inductive inferences. Thus, because
there are good reasons to reject the view that the relation-
ship between satisfactions of the Bradford Hill criteria and
the causal claims they purport to justify is a deductive rela-
tionship, the obvious conclusion to draw is that the rela-
tionship must be inductive. Since strong inductive
inferences, in contrast to valid deductive inferences, make
it improbable, but not impossible, that the conclusion of
an inductive argument is false given that the premisesEpidemiologic Perspectives & Innovations 2009, 6:2 http://www.epi-perspectives.com/content/6/1/2
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(evidential statements) are true, then understanding the
relationship between satisfactions of Bradford Hill criteria
and a causal claim seems consonant with what Bradford
Hill claimed about the criteria ("aspects of association").
For example, Bradford Hill writes:
What I do not believe – and this has been suggested –
is that we can usefully lay down some hard-and-fast
rules of evidence that must be obeyed before we accept
cause and effect. None of my nine viewpoints can
bring indisputable evidence for or against the cause-
and-effect hypothesis and none can be required as a
sine qua non [67].
As suggested by this quotation, Bradford Hill did not con-
ceive of the satisfaction of the "aspects of statistical associ-
ation" as sufficient conditions (singularly or jointly) for
justifying a claim that a specific association was a causal
relation [101,102]. Moreover, with the possible exception
of the temporal priority of a cause to its effect, he did not
conceive of the satisfaction of the "aspects of statistical
association" as necessary conditions (singularly or
jointly) for a specific statistical association being a causal
relation. Based on this, it seems reasonable to conclude
that Bradford Hill's own understanding of the criteria is
consistent with the view that the support their satisfaction
offers to a causal claim is something less than that their
satisfaction deductively entails the truth of a causal claim.
This is certainly consonant with many writers who advo-
cate, use or discuss the Bradford Hill criteria. For example,
Russo and Williamson write that "while these criteria were
intended as a guide in assessing causality, they do not
ensure causality with certainty" [103], while Kundi writes
that satisfaction of the Bradford Hill criteria are non-con-
clusively supportive of a causal claim "but cannot be used
to dismiss the assumption of a causal claim" [104]. Simi-
larly, in studies that use Bradford Hill criteria, at least
some qualify their conclusions by claiming that the statis-
tical associations are "likely to be causal" [45], that the
evidence provided by the criteria's satisfaction underdeter-
mines the truth of the causal conclusion [105], or that sat-
isfaction of the criteria only decreases the likelihood that
statistical association is not causal [106]. To sum up, there
are good reasons for understanding the satisfaction of
Bradford Hill criteria as inductively justifying a causal
claim, which amounts to claiming that the criteria, to use
Cartwright's useful expression, merely vouch for the truth
of a causal claim without offering any assurance of its
truth [37,107].
Before assessing the use of satisfactions of Bradford Hill
criteria as evidence in an inductive inference, we need to
be clearer about what it means to call an inference an
inductive inference. As Bird notes [108], there are two dis-
tinct senses of what it means to be an inductive inference
that are often confused. Although both agree that induc-
tive inferences, unlike valid deductive inferences, are
ampliative, they differ in their specificity and precision.
On the one hand, inductive inferences are those kinds of
ampliative inferences in which the premises are specific
(usually empirical) statements, and the conclusion is a
general statement. For example, although, regrettably,
conflating the logical and psychological conceptions of
induction, Rothman writes that the "method of induction
starts with observations on nature. To the extent that the
observations fall into a pattern, the observations are said
to induce in the mind of the observer a suggestion of a
more general statement about nature" [109]. The classic
example of this kind of inductive inference is enumerative
induction, which has the general form that from the fact
that all observed A's are B's, we may infer that it is not prob-
able that all A's (or some percentage of A's larger than the
percentage observed) are B's is false. On the other hand,
there is a broader meaning of inductive inference. Accord-
ing to this broader meaning, an inductive inference is any
logical inference that is not deductively valid inference
where, if the inference is a strong one, "it is improbable,
given that the premises are true, that the conclusion is
false" [93]. There are at least two reasons for preferring the
latter to the former meaning of inductive inference. First,
not all traditionally acknowledged examples of inductive
inference fit the model exemplified by enumerative induc-
tion. For example, the inference from the sun having risen
every morning in recorded history to the conclusion that
the sun will rise tomorrow is an inductive inference from
a general premise to a particular conclusion [110]. Sec-
ond, the broader meaning of inductive inference permits
us to separate more clearly the logical sense of inference
from the psychological sense of inference. While asser-
tions about inductive inferences express the speaker's
beliefs, they are not, as noted, by Maher, "about  the
speaker's beliefs" [111]. Moreover, the broader meaning
of inductive inference includes, when attention is
restricted to the logical sense of inference, the narrower
meaning of inductive inference as an inference from par-
ticular premises to a general conclusion. For these rea-
sons, the following analyses use the second, broader
meaning of inductive inference.
Let us suppose that B1...B9 represent the nine Bradford Hill
criteria and that C represents a causal conclusion. On the
assumption that each of B1...B9 is satisfied and so true,
then B1...B9 strongly inductively supports C just in case it
is improbable that C is false. However, the natural ques-
tion to ask at this point is whether it is, in fact, true that if
each of B1...B9 is satisfied, and so true, then it is improba-
ble that C is false. This is a form of what is sometimes
known as the "problem of induction." More generally, the
problem, as has been long recognized, is to state precisely
what it is about a set of conditions that guarantees thatEpidemiologic Perspectives & Innovations 2009, 6:2 http://www.epi-perspectives.com/content/6/1/2
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when those conditions are satisfied, this satisfaction
makes it improbable that the associated conclusion is
false. If we cannot identify what it is about the conditions
that guarantee this result, then there will be no way to dis-
tinguish strong inductive inferences from weak inductive
inferences. Indeed, it was Hume's inability to identify
what it is about what he called the "experimental method"
that guaranteed the improbability of inferred conclusions
being false that led him to treat the problem of inductive
inference as a problem of human psychology. For Hume,
there is no logical sense of inductive inference; inductive
inferences are all psychological inferences [112,113].
The works of Rudolf Carnap illustrate one approach to
making sense of the logical conception of inductive infer-
ence. Because, according to Carnap, "the fundamental
concept of inductive logic is probability [114]", he begins
by drawing a distinction between what he calls the logical
sense of probability, understood as "degree of confirma-
tion", and the empirical concept of probability (statistical
probability), understood as "the relative frequency in the
long run of one property with respect to another" [115].
Based on this distinction, Carnap writes that the goal of
inductive logic is to "measure the support which the given
evidence supplies for the tentatively assumed hypothesis"
[115], where the support is formalized in terms of "degree
of confirmation", and so, logical probability. In the case
of the Bradford Hill criteria, this means that, from the Car-
napian point of view, what inductive logic should do is
the measure the support that satisfactions of the criteria
provide for the causal claim hypothesized as a possibility
based on an already identified statistical association. Since
the relevant conception of probability is logical probabil-
ity, to accomplish this task, Carnap believed that it is nec-
essary to characterize inductive logic "like deductive logic
... [as] a branch of semantics. [115]" This understanding
of inductive logic raises at least three different problems.
First, it requires a precise, "rational reconstruction" of the
satisfactions of the Bradford Hill criteria, and the causal
conclusion, as appropriate instantiations of well-formed
formulae within a logical system where the rules of induc-
tive logical inference are defined. This mirrors the require-
ment, considered earlier, for treating the relationship
between satisfactions of the Bradford Hill criteria and a
causal claim as a valid, deductive relationship. Making
certain that (claims about) the applications of the Brad-
ford Hill criteria are "appropriate" instantiations of well-
formed formulae in the theory of inductive inference is a
necessary condition for validating, within the inductive
theory, the claim that satisfactions of the Bradford Hill cri-
teria inductively support the inferred conclusion [114]. As
such, the same kinds of problems associated with the
identification and translation of natural language sen-
tences into well-formed formulae in the case of treating
the relationship between satisfactions of the Bradford Hill
criteria and a causal claim as a deductive relationship
occur here as well.
Second, even assuming that there is an acceptable solu-
tion to the problem of providing the appropriate rational
reconstructions, there is still the problem of validating the
inductive inference rules that constitute the system of
inductive logic into which the satisfactions of the Brad-
ford Hill criteria and conclusion have been translated.
This is the problem of the justification of induction.
Although there are many formulations of the problem,
one way to formulate it is to take advantage of Carnap's
claim that inductive logic, like deductive logic, is a branch
of semantics. Thus, if A1...An-1, An is a sequence of well-for-
mulated formulae in a formalized logical language L,
where A1...An-1 are the premises and An is the conclusion,
then A1...An-1, An is (semantically) inductively strong in L
just in case it is improbable that An is false in all interpre-
tations [models] in which A1...An-1 are true. The problem,
then, is whether there are any inductive inference rules
whose adoption is consistent with the semantic concep-
tion of an inductively strong argument [116]. It is true that
one obvious kind of response to this would be to say that
if an inference rule, R, is, in all observed instances of appli-
cation, consistent with the semantic conception of an
inductively strong argument, then we are justified in using
the inference rule. However, as should be obvious from
this formulation, this response is tantamount to using a
kind of inductive inference to justify the inference rule R.
In this case, though, the problem remerges when asked to
justify this additional inference rule, and an infinite
explanatory regress threatens the entire account. Although
there are other approaches to justifying induction (e.g. the
pragmatic justification originated by Reichenbach [117]
and the analytic justification suggested by Harré [118]),
"none has received widespread acceptance. [119]"
The third problem is one that, following a suggestion by
Hempel, we might call "the problem of desiderata" [120].
This is the problem that in any inductive determination of
the degree of confirmation conferred on a conclusion
from premises assumed to be true, it is not enough to take
into account only the information provided by the
premises. Hempel frames the problem by asking the fol-
lowing question:
On the basis of different sets of statements that we
consider as true, a given hypothesis h  ... can be
assigned quite different probabilities; which of these,
if any, is to count as a guide in forming our beliefs con-
cerning the truth of h and in making decisions whose
outcome depend on whether h is true? [121]"
According to both Hempel and Carnap, to answer this
question requires the adoption of a principle known asEpidemiologic Perspectives & Innovations 2009, 6:2 http://www.epi-perspectives.com/content/6/1/2
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"the requirement of total evidence." As noted by Carnap,
the requirement of total evidence says that in any induc-
tive inference, "we have to take as evidence ... the total evi-
dence  available to a person in question at the time in
question, that is to say, his total knowledge of the results
of his observations" [122]. The requirement of total evi-
dence is not a requirement of the formal inductive system
of logic but is, instead, "a maxim for the application of
inductive logic" [123]. While it may seem simple enough
to incorporate this requirement, its adoption (even ignor-
ing the problems of formalization already faced by treat-
ing applications of Bradford Hill criteria to support a
causal claim as inductive inferences) has at least two
unwelcome consequences. First, it means that all induc-
tive inferences are relative to the knowledge possessed by
the person making the inferences. Thus, all assessments of
inductive inferential strength require a full accounting of
the relevant background information, and consequently
entail that we need some means of assessing amounts and
kinds of information. Second, and more worrisome, the
requirement seems to lead to the "new riddle of induc-
tion" identified and described by Nelson Goodman [124].
The problem, put briefly, is that once the need for such
information is conceded, no matter what additional infor-
mation is provided, that evidence, together with the evi-
dence provided by the other statements assumed true,
from which an inductive inference to a conclusion is
drawn, underdetermines what conclusion it is permissible
to draw. The threat, then, is that any set of inductive infer-
ential rules strong enough to justify claiming that a statis-
tical association is a causal relation will permit too much.
There is no principled way to say that the application of a
set of inductive inference rules, together with an assump-
tion that a set of premises (e.g. applications of Bradford
Hill criteria) are true and a specification of the "total evi-
dence" available, will justify inductively inferring a single
conclusion as opposed to a myriad of other conclusions
[125].
Still, perhaps we can successfully accomplish in the case of
inductive inferences what we could not in the case of
deductive inferences. In particular, maybe we can weaken
(make less formal) the characterization of what a strong
inductive inference is in a way that permits us to use satis-
factions of the Bradford Hill criteria to justify, in some
looser inductive sense, a causal claim. One possibility
along these lines is to say that although they are not rigid
criteria whose satisfaction is required for making a justi-
fied causal inference, applications of the criteria "still give
positive support to inferences about causality" [126], and
one can compare the results of commensurate applica-
tions of the criteria to one another. There are two key ideas
at work here. The first is that while no satisfactions of any
of the criteria are, singularly or jointly, necessary or suffi-
cient for justifying the claim that a statistical association is
a causal claim, the satisfactions of one or more of the cri-
teria provide at least some informal inductive support to
the claim that a statistical association is a causal relation.
The second key idea is that there is no specific require-
ment for "rational reconstruction" of the satisfactions of
the Bradford Hill criteria or the causal conclusion into a
formalized language within which precise characteriza-
tions of the inductive inferences exist. Instead, there is a
much looser idea at work. Regardless of how we assess
whether or not, and to what degree the Bradford Hill cri-
teria are satisfied, as long as there are consistent assess-
ments of applications of the Bradford Hill criteria we can
create ordinal rankings of sets of assessments. For exam-
ple, on the assumption that the strength of a dose-
response is an indicator of the presence and strength of a
biological gradient, then in the case where there are two
statistical associations to the same event, the statistical
association having the stronger dose-response provides
the greater positive support to its claim that the statistical
association is a causal relation [74,87,126-129].
While this avoids some of the problems associated with a
more formal characterization of inductive inferences and
inductive inferential rules, there are at least three prob-
lems with this interpretation of the inductive support pro-
vided by satisfactions of the Bradford Hill criteria. First, to
the degree that Rothman et al. are correct that "the stand-
ards of epidemiologic evidence offered by Hill are saddled
with reservations and exceptions" [100], it will be, at best,
difficult to quantify the satisfactions of the criteria to
assess degrees of confirmation. Without the ability to
quantify the satisfactions of the criteria, the only reference
cases against which it seems possible to measure the
degree of confirmation are the null case, where no criteria
are satisfied, or the singleton case where the one possible
sine qua non criterion, temporal priority, is satisfied.
Although some writers believe that "it is relatively
straightforward to describe the conditions" under which
the criteria are "clearly not satisfied" [22], using the null
case to make comparisons permits too much. The com-
parison would lead to claiming that any satisfaction of
one or more of the criteria is evidence of a causal connec-
tion, without permitting any comparison among the cases
in which one or more of the same criteria are satisfied. For
example, suppose that there are three statistical associa-
tions, where commensurate applications of the Bradford
Hill criteria to all three results in saying that the first two
associations satisfy the same five criteria while the third
satisfies only four of the five criteria satisfied by the first
two. What can we conclude? If there is no way to quantify
the satisfactions of the Bradford Hill criteria, all we can
conclude is that the inferences that the first two statistical
associations are causal relations are stronger than the
inference that the third statistical association is a causal
relation. There is, though, no way to make any compara-Epidemiologic Perspectives & Innovations 2009, 6:2 http://www.epi-perspectives.com/content/6/1/2
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tive assessment of the first two statistical associations. The
ordinal ranking of satisfactions of the Bradford Hill crite-
ria, in this case, seems too coarse grained to be of much
practical value.
The second problem is that even if we can assess degrees
of confirmation in a manner that permits a more fine-
grained ordinal ranking (and so avoiding the first prob-
lem), all causal claims will be relative to other causal
claims for which one has good reasons for believing that
they have less confirmation. Causal claims are never
claims simpliciter, but rather are always claims relative to
one or more other possible contenders. Using causal crite-
ria to assess whether a statistical association is a causal
relationship is, to vary a remark by Rosenberg, "always a
comparative affair" [130]. It only makes sense to say that
a particular causal claim, C, "is more or less well con-
firmed by the evidence" relative to the criteria than is
causal claim C*, not that C is confirmed, relative to the
causal criteria, "in any absolute sense". Thus, imagine that
one wonders whether a particular factor (or event), X, that
is statistically associated with another factor (or event), Y,
is a cause of Y. On this interpretation of the Bradford Hill
criteria, the answer is never "yes" or "no", but only "yes"
or "no" relative to other possible causes of Y. For example,
suppose that the probability of X being a cause of Y, given
some measure of the satisfaction of the Bradford Hill cri-
teria, is greater than the probability of some other X*
being a cause of Y, given some commensurate measure of
the satisfaction of the criteria. It follows from this that we
can say that, compared to X*, we are justified in asserting
that X is the cause of Y. However, it is important to recog-
nize the limits of this kind of claim. While it may seem
that we are led to say that X is the cause of Y while X* is
not, that is not correct. Instead, on the assumption that
the probability assessment can be made, the most that we
can assert is that the causal influence of X on Y is greater
than the causal influence of X* on Y. On this account, we
can rule out X* having a causal influence on Y only if X*
satisfies none of the causal criteria we use to make the
causal claim. Thus, except for the limiting case in which
none of the criteria is satisfied, the conclusion appears to
be that all statistical associations that satisfy Bradford Hill
criteria are, to a greater or lesser extent, causal relation-
ships. From the worry of not being able to identify any
causal relations, we have slipped to the other extreme of
finding too many causal relations; all statistical associa-
tions are causal relations, though of varying degree.
The third problem is an extension of the second problem.
Suppose that B1...B9 refer to each of the nine Bradford Hill
criteria. Moreover, suppose that we have a statistical asso-
ciation between X and Y, and so wonder whether the
claim that X causes Y is justified. To take a simple example,
suppose that we know that smoking is statistically associ-
ated with cancer, and we wonder whether smoking causes
cancer. On the present proposal, what we would do, pre-
sumably, is to examine whether the relationship between
smoking and cancer satisfies the Bradford Hill criteria.
Thus, we could examine how plausible it is to suppose
that there is a biological relation relationship between
smoking and the cancer in question, we could examine
whether the relationship between smoking and cancer has
been "repeatedly observed by different persons, in differ-
ent places, circumstances and times" [67], and so forth. As
Weed notes, in cancer epidemiology, the most likely
choice of Bradford Hill criteria to use are "consistency,
strength, dose response and biological plausibility, leav-
ing behind coherence, specificity, analogy and (interest-
ingly) temporality" [131]. Of course, even by examining
all these satisfactions of the Bradford Hill criteria, nothing
immediately follows. Because, on this interpretation of
the inductive support that satisfactions of Bradford Hill
criteria give to a causal claim, assessments of whether a
statistical association is a causal relationship are always
relative to alternative assessments, we need additional
possible causal claims against which to assess the current
application of the criteria. What other possible claims
should we consider?
One possibility is to say that we should compare the cur-
rent causal claim against the claim that no causal relation-
ship between smoking and cancer is present. Recall,
though, that we make applications of the Bradford Hill
criteria only to existing (recognized) statistical associa-
tions. Therefore, since the claim that no causal relation-
ship between smoking and cancer is present is, in the
limiting case, the claim that there is no statistical associa-
tion between smoking and cancer, it follows that the lim-
iting case is, de facto, ruled out by the presence of the
statistical association. This means that we still need
another statistical association involving cancer as a
"cause" to which we can apply the Bradford Hill criteria
and compare the results of those applications to the appli-
cation of the criteria to the statistical association of smok-
ing and cancer. Since all smoking is an activity associated
with many other activities of life, then the obvious choice
is to examine whether there is a statistical association
between one or more of those other activities of life and
cancer. If so, then we can apply the Bradford Hill criteria
to those other associations and thus be in a position to
make the kind of comparative assessment required by this
understanding of the role of the Bradford Hill criteria. It is
precisely here that the problem occurs. There is going to
be a very large number of statistical associations that we
could subject to evaluation by use of the Bradford Hill cri-
teria. Some, such as drinking coffee or consuming alco-
holic beverages, present themselves as obvious
candidates, while others, such as waking up in the morn-
ing, seem to be rather silly. Curiously, it is the silly possi-Epidemiologic Perspectives & Innovations 2009, 6:2 http://www.epi-perspectives.com/content/6/1/2
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bilities that pose the problem. The statistical association
between waking up in the morning and cancer may make
it a silly candidate for applications of the Bradford Hill cri-
teria to form the appropriate contrasts, but what makes it
silly? One might say that what makes it silly is the strength
of the statistical association, but of course, this is itself one
of the Bradford Hill criteria, and so it follows that this
method of demarcation is using one of Bradford Hill cri-
teria to rule out applications of the other criteria.
The question now shifts to what it is that justifies this use
of the Bradford Hill criterion (the criterion of statistical
strength) as opposed some different criterion or set of cri-
teria. The problem is analogous to the "problem of induc-
tion" raised earlier. Either we have some other criteria
though whose use we justify applying the full range of
Bradford Hill criteria to a statistical association, or we do
not. If we do, then we have the problem of justifying the
application of these new criteria, which seems to threaten
the same kind of explanatory regress considered earlier. If
we lack some other criteria, then either the choice to take
only some and not all statistical associations seriously is
ad hoc, or else, to be consistent, we need to evaluate all the
statistical associations. In the former case, there is no basis
for resolving disagreements between choices of which sta-
tistical associations to subject to evaluation by applica-
tions of the Bradford Hill criteria. You choose one set of
statistical associations and I choose another, and (apart
from a way of adjudicating different theories incorporat-
ing different causal claims) that is the end of the matter.
Although this state of affairs appears to reflect Susser's
observation that in the case of judgments about causality,
"there are no absolute rules, and different workers often
come to conflicting conclusions" [64], it is difficult to
understand why, even if true in practice, one would
embrace this as a welcome entailment of a theory of
causal inference. In the latter case, the requirement to test
all the statistical associations is, except for very narrowly
defined and artificial cases, practically impossible.
Suppose, though, that we somehow agree (and that our
agreement is, in some sense or another, "justified") on a
set of alternative statistical associations to which we will
apply the Bradford Hill criteria. To keep matters simple,
imagine that we have agreed that there are only two statis-
tical associations to assess, and that X-Y is the first statisti-
cal association while X*-Y is the second statistical
association. Since we have agreed to assess both, we apply
the Bradford Hill criteria to the two associations (where
the applications are commensurate to one another) and
report the results. In the first case, by applying the criteria
we discover that we have measures for six of the nine cri-
teria, while in the second case, we have measures for only
five of the nine criteria. In addition, we discover that there
is information on an application of at least one criterion
in each of the two sets for which information in the other
set does not exist. Using B1...B9 to represent the nine crite-
ria (with no correspondence to the order in Bradford
Hill's presentation intended), we have information on the
satisfaction of B1...B6 in the first case, while in the second
case we have information on the satisfaction of B3...B7.
The problem is that because different sets of Bradford Hill
criteria are satisfied in the two cases, any ordinal compar-
ison of the two applications can only be on the overlap-
ping criteria. That may not seem so problematic in this
case, but suppose that we have a third statistical associa-
tion, X**-Y to which we can apply (for whatever reason)
only one of the Bradford Hill criteria. In this case, to use
the ordinal metric presupposed by the interpretation of
the inductive character of the Bradford Hill criteria we are
examining requires that we can only compare the three
statistical relationships based on the application of the
single Bradford Hill criterion. Notice that while some
"weight of evidence" methodologies suggest otherwise
[132], it will not do to say that the inability to apply a
Bradford Hill criterion is the same as saying that the Brad-
ford Hill criterion is not satisfied. After all, counterfactu-
ally, it might be true that if the criterion had been applied
in one case (say the case of X-R) it would have had a
higher degree of satisfaction that the degree of satisfaction
in the case in which it was, in fact, applied (say X*-R). This
means that when assessing applications of Bradford Hill
criteria to (alternative) statistical associations, we have
two options. Either we must use only those criteria
applied commensurably applied to all the statistical asso-
ciations, or we need some way to make assessments about
the relative importance of the criteria so that having infor-
mation about the satisfaction of some counts for more
than lack of information about others. In the first case, we
could imagine that although forced to use only one crite-
rion, the statistical association actually strongly satisfied
the other criteria, but that this was not information we
could justifiably use in making the comparative assess-
ment of statistical associations. In the second case, what
Weed refers to as the problem of the "selection and prior-
itization of the criteria" [133], we are back to the problem
of needing some additional criteria to assess the relative
value of the various Bradford Hill criteria used in making
an assessment about a causal claim. For reasons adduced
earlier, this seems to lead once again to an explanatory
regress.
At this point, we seem led to the conclusion that because
there are so many difficulties associated with the use of
Bradford Hill criteria, we are justified in expunging their use
entirely when assessing whether there is sufficient justifica-
tion to claim that a statistical association is a causal rela-
tion. Regardless of whether the causal inferences based on
satisfactions of Bradford Hill criteria are deductive infer-
ence or inductive inferences, there are problems that under-Epidemiologic Perspectives & Innovations 2009, 6:2 http://www.epi-perspectives.com/content/6/1/2
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mine their use in justifying the claim that a statistical
association is a causal relation. However, for the supporters
and advocates of the Bradford Hill criteria, the situation is
not so bleak as is suggested by the foregoing analyses.
Recall that Bradford Hill never referred to the "causal crite-
ria" as "criteria" but, instead, referred to them as "aspects of
association", "features of consideration" and "viewpoints"
[67]. Moreover, as noted earlier, writers such as Philips and
Goodman [68,69] go to some pains to point out that the
"aspects of association" that we have been referring to as
causal criteria "clearly do not meet usual definitions of cri-
teria" [68]. According to Bradford Hill, the value of the "cri-
teria" is that their satisfaction can, "with greater or lesser
strength ... help us make up our minds on the fundamental
question – is there any other way of explaining the set of
facts before us, is there any other answer equally, or more
likely than cause and effect? [67]" One way to interpret this
claim that significantly weakens the "testing" role of the cri-
teria is that while satisfactions of the criteria are neither nec-
essary nor sufficient conditions for justifying claims that
statistical associations are causal relations, they are, never-
theless, good "guidelines" or "rules of thumb" for how we
should exercise caution when making causal claims. When
inferring a causal relation from a statistical association, we
should always keep the Bradford Hill criteria in mind and
be conservative in the inferences we accept. On this inter-
pretation, the role of the criteria is not to justify causal infer-
ences, but, instead, to provide some "aids to thought", as
Doll puts it [127], to follow whenever we use some other
(still undecided method or methods) for justifying causal
inferences.
The obvious problem that this interpretation seems to
face is that if satisfactions of the criteria are neither neces-
sary nor sufficient for justifiably claiming that a statistical
association is a causal relation, then they are neither nec-
essary nor sufficient as recommendations for how  one
should be cautious when making causal inferences. To
take a simple example, suppose that someone decides to
investigate whether a statistical association is a causal rela-
tion and, knowing the Bradford Hill criteria, we caution
the person about to conduct the investigation to keep the
criterion of constancy in mind when making any causal
inferences from the statistical association. The person
about to conduct the investigation might very well be puz-
zled by this and ask both how he or she should take con-
sistency into account when considering the causal
inference, and, even more generally, why consistency
should be taken into account. In answering the first ques-
tion, perhaps we should remember the concerns and crit-
icisms of Rothman et al. about the Bradford criteria being
"saddled with reservations and exceptions" [100]. If cor-
rect, then there is no simple, unequivocal answer to this
question. Other than suggesting that the person look for
instances of the statistical association in a variety of differ-
ent conditions, it is not clear what can be said. While this
may be helpful in some very general way, this kind of gen-
eral caution is certainly not unique to the Bradford Hill
criteria. The problem posed by the second question is
even more severe. Since consistency is not a necessary con-
dition for a statistical association to be a causal relation,
then its absence, by itself, cannot undermine the person's
causal claim. Moreover, since consistency is not a suffi-
cient condition for a statistical association to be a causal
relation, then its presence, by itself, is no guarantee that
the statistical association is a causal relation. However, it
is really more than this. Presumably, the idea behind
treating the Bradford Hill criteria as "aids to thought" or
"useful guidelines" is that their use will somehow contrib-
ute to an increased likelihood that a causal inference is a
justified causal inference. The question, though, is how we
are to understand this if the applications of the criteria are
not themselves part of the inferential justification. It may
be true that satisfaction of the criteria results in a greater
likelihood that one will correctly apply whatever method
one chooses to use to justify causal inferences. Unfortu-
nately, this does not seem like a plausible interpretation.
On the one hand, the criteria do not seem to be about the
use of methods, but rather about statistical associations.
On the other hand, even if they are "aids to thought"
whose usefulness comes from constraints they place on
applications of some chosen method for making causal
inferences, why suppose that the method for which the
Bradford Hill criteria are constraints is the (or at least a)
proper method? If the method for which the Bradford Hill
criteria are constraints is the "correct" method because the
Bradford Hill criteria guide that inferential method "in the
right way" in identifying causal relations, then, in reality,
the Bradford Hill criteria are themselves criteria for mak-
ing justified inferences, even though they are not the
"final" criteria. Here, though, we are back to trying to
make some sense of how they can serve this function in
light of all the problems associated with linking them to
either deductive or inductive inferences. If there is no
independent reason for thinking that the method for
which the Bradford Hill criteria provide constraints is the
appropriate method for identifying which statistical asso-
ciations are causal relations, then the Bradford Hill criteria
have no utility in the project of justified causal inferences.
If, though, there are independent reasons for accepting the
method for which the Bradford Hill criteria provide con-
straints, then it is not clear what kind of constraints the
Bradford Hill criteria provide. It would seem that applica-
tions of the Bradford Hill criteria are, in this case, inde-
pendent of the chosen method for justifying causal
inferences, and so provide no real constraints at all. Thus,
either the criteria have very little or no use as meta-meth-
odological criteria, or their use presupposes that they
really are, in some way or another, criteria whose use will
provide some kind of justification for causal inferences.Epidemiologic Perspectives & Innovations 2009, 6:2 http://www.epi-perspectives.com/content/6/1/2
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At this point, let us backtrack a bit. Suppose that we do
concede that even as aids to thought, satisfactions of the
Bradford Hill criteria do, in some sense, justify causal
inferences and the causal conclusions of those inferences.
The objection to this was that the foregoing analyses have
demonstrated that there are many difficulties associated
with using the criteria, regardless of whether we look at
their possible role in deductive or inductive inferences.
However, what is important to bring out is an implicit
assumption at work in this objection. The implicit
assumption is that all logical inferences are either deduc-
tive or inductive (or some combination), and that this
dichotomy is an exhaustive one. It is certainly true, as
remarked earlier, that this is a traditional and widely held
view about the nature and character of logical inferences.
As it happens, though, the assumption does not appear to
be true. Having its roots in C.S. Peirce's account of abduc-
tion (or what he later called retroduction), there is a third
kind of logical inference that, since the middle 1960s, has
played "an enormous role in many philosophical argu-
ments and, according to its defenders, an essential role in
scientific and common-sense reasoning" [134]. This third
kind of logical inference is called "inference to the best
explanation" [135,136], and it is here, I believe, that we
can find a defensible role for the Bradford Hill criteria.
As noted by Thagard, in "his writings before 1890, Peirce
classified arguments into three types: deduction, induc-
tion, and hypothesis" [137]. However, by the early years
of the twentieth century, Peirce had substituted "abduc-
tion" for "Hypothesis", and would later substitute "retro-
duction" for "abduction". For example, in an April 1903
lecture delivered at Harvard University, Peirce said that
there are three different kinds of reasoning – "Abduction,
Induction, and Deduction" [138]. For Peirce, deductive
reasoning "is the only necessary reasoning" [138] and
proves that something must be" [139], and inductive rea-
soning "is the experimental testing of a theory" [138] that
"consists in starting from a theory, deducing from it pre-
dictions of phenomena, and observing those phenomena
in order to see how nearly they agree with the theory"
[139]. In contrast to both deduction and induction,
abduction "consists in studying facts and devising a the-
ory to explain them, [138]" and in this way, "is the process
of forming an explanatory hypothesis" [139]. Thus, for
Peirce abductive reasoning is a kind of logical inference
that begins with the available facts "without, at the outset,
having any particular theory in view, though it is moti-
vated by the feeling that a theory is needed to explain" the
facts [140], and discovering a conjecture (hypothesis)
"that furnishes a possible Explanation" [141].
In 1965, Gilbert Harman introduced the expression
"inference to the best explanation" and wrote that "'The
inference to the best explanation' corresponds to what
others have called 'abduction"' [135]. According to Har-
man, in making an inference to the best explanation, "one
infers, from the fact that a certain hypothesis would
explain the evidence, to the truth of that hypothesis"
[135]. Of course, it is likely that there will be a number of
hypotheses that, to one degree or another, "explain" the
evidence. What inference to the best explanation provides
is a method wherein by "starting out with a set of data",
we are justified in inferring what hypothesis to take seri-
ously as a starting point for further investigations on the
grounds that the hypothesis is the best (in some, to this
point, undefined sense of "best") hypothesis that explains
the data [142]. Sometimes, the method of inference to the
best explanation is expressed counterfactually. For exam-
ple, Lipton writes that we should understand inference to
the best explanation as an inference in which given "our
data and our background beliefs, we infer what would, if
true, provide the best of competing explanations we can
generate of those data" [136]. The importance of the
counterfactual formulation of inference to the best expla-
nation is that it presents the hypothetical character of the
conclusion of the inference. In inference to the best expla-
nation, what we get is a hypothetical truth rather than a
conclusion guaranteed true or confirmed improbable to
be false. This concurs with Peirce's claim that abduction
"does not afford security" [141] and that its purpose is to
create a hypothesis, explaining the data, which we must
then test by the appropriate deductive and inductive infer-
ences.
Although there is debate about whether contemporary
characterizations of inference to the best explanation
(IBE) fully and accurately capture the view of abduction
(retroduction) to which Peirce finally came [143,144],
there are three important characteristics of most contem-
porary formulations of IBE that are largely shared with
various remarks in Peirce's writing. First, while the tradi-
tional characterizations of deductive and inductive infer-
ences take place independently of characterizations of
what constitutes an explanation, there is a combination of
inference and explanation in IBE. As Lipton writes, far
"from explanation only coming on the scene after the
inferential work is done, the core idea of Inference to the
Best Explanation is that explanatory considerations are a
guide to inference" [136]. In a similar vein, Douven writes
that advocates of IBE "all share the conviction that explan-
atory considerations have confirmation-theoretical
import" [145]. The second characteristic of IBE shared
with Peirce's conception of abduction/retroduction is that
IBE is a logical inference. In the context of examining the
role of the Bradford Hill criteria, this is an especially
important point. The dilemma presented by the earlier
analysis was that either we understand applications of
Bradford Hill criteria in their role as premises in deductive
or inductive causal inferences, or we understand applica-Epidemiologic Perspectives & Innovations 2009, 6:2 http://www.epi-perspectives.com/content/6/1/2
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tions of Bradford Hill criteria as having no direct role in
causal inferences. Both horns of the dilemma seem to lead
to unacceptable problems, but in linking applications of
the Bradford Hill criteria to IBE, we grasp the dilemma by
the first horn, and attempt to defuse the dilemma by iden-
tifying a role for applications of the Bradford Hill criteria
in a different kind of causal inference. The third character-
istic, related to the tie between inference and explanation
in IBE, is that IBE is not a "logic of proof" in the sense that
deductive and inductive inferences are logics of proof, but
is instead a "logic of discovery" [146-149]. What this
means is that the explanatory character of IBE entails that
the inference does not simply restate information already
present in the data from which it starts (as in deduction)
or try to use information already present in the data to
confirm the low probability that a conclusion is false (as
in induction). Instead, in IBE the data provides the con-
text for making a logical, albeit non-deductive and non-
inductive, inference to a hypothesis that (best) explains
the facts. In this sense, IBE "discovers" the hypothesis that
best explains the data. Thus, IBE rejects Popper's claim
that "conceiving or inventing a theory" does not call for "a
logical analysis" and that there "is no such thing as a log-
ical method of having new ideas, or a logical reconstruc-
tion of this process" [146]. Using a distinction drawn by
Hanson, we can make the point by saying that whereas
both inductive and deductive inferences provide justifica-
tion for a hypothesis, IBE provides good reasons for "sug-
gesting" a hypothesis, whose justification (in the former
sense of deductive or inductive inferential inquiry) we
ought to undertake [147,149]. Admittedly, there is some
tension between advocates of IBE who insist that IBE pro-
vides reason for believing that the hypotheses resulting
from applications of IBE to data are true [134,135,142]
and those who believe that while the hypotheses have
explanatory virtues we should refrain from calling them
"true" [144]. However, the counterfactual formulation,
that inference to the best explanation results in a hypoth-
esis that, if true, would provide the best explanation, is the
"middle" position capturing the important elements of
both sides in the debate. Moreover, this interpretation of
IBE seems best suited to distinguish clearly IBE, as a logi-
cal inference, from both deductive and inductive infer-
ences where the (necessary or probable) truth or falsity of
the conclusion is an important characteristic of the infer-
ence. Consequently, in the discussions and analyses that
follow, the form of IBE used is one that incorporates the
counterfactual truth-value characterization of the conclu-
sion of the inference.
Before fleshing out some of the details, it is worth noticing
that understanding the role of satisfactions of the Brad-
ford Hill criteria in this way – as the data used in IBE –
seems to sit well with at least some accounts of the role of
the Bradford Hill criteria in epidemiology and health serv-
ices research. For example, Kaufman and Poole write that
lists of causal criteria, such as the Bradford Hill criteria,
have emerged "as informal test of whether alternative
explanations (e.g. confounding) are likely to exist for the
hypothesis of causality" [70]. Put into the language of IBE,
applications of the Bradford Hill criteria to data lead to
the discovery of the most plausible (hypothetical) expla-
nation of an observed statistical association. In a similar
vein, Phillips and Goodman suggest that the Bradford Hill
criteria (which they insist are not criteria at all) function
informally to introduce "common sense" into the search
for what causal claims to accept [68]. If "common sense"
is understood as a kind of process of discovering possibil-
ities and weeding them out, a view of common sense that,
as noted by Höfler, is consistent with the philosophical
tradition [150], then this view is, in important respects,
similar to the view in which satisfactions of the Bradford
Hill criteria play a role in IBE. In his discussion of the pre-
cautionary principle and public health, Weed makes a
comment that seems to suggest that he too might be ame-
nable to linking satisfactions of the Bradford Hill criteria
to IBE. Weed writes that causal criteria are "the most com-
monly-used method of interpreting scientific evidence in
public health", and that the criteria "are 'applied' to the
available evidence after it has been collected and summa-
rized in a systematic narrative review" [88]. If we focus on
the ideas of interpretation and applications to available
data, then this view, in its broad outlines, seems conso-
nant with the idea that, in IBE, the inference is an instance
of both a logic of justification (proof) and a logic of dis-
covery. Finally, even Bradford Hill seems to have had
something like the IBE role of the criteria in mind when
writing about them in his Presidential Address. What
Bradford Hill claimed in that address is that the satisfac-
tions of the criteria can help us in making up our minds
about the "fundamental question – is there any other way
of explaining the set of facts before us, is there any other
answer equally, or more, likely than cause an effect? [67]"
Here, what Bradford Hill has done is to link explicitly the
kind of inference supported by satisfactions of the criteria
with "explaining the set of facts before us", which is pre-
cisely the kind of link IBE makes.
What, then, does it mean to place satisfactions of the Brad-
ford Hill criteria in the framework of IBE? There are at least
three important consequences of such a placement. First,
and foremost, it means that satisfactions of the Bradford
Hill criteria do not "justify" causal claims in the traditional
sense of "justify"; satisfactions of the Bradford Hill criteria
neither guarantee the truth of a causal conclusion nor make
it improbable that a causal conclusion is false. It follows
that studies claiming to apply "the criteria proposed by
Bradford-Hill to establish causality between associated
phenomena" [151] or that satisfactions of the Bradford Hill
criteria "operationally" justify the existence of a causal rela-Epidemiologic Perspectives & Innovations 2009, 6:2 http://www.epi-perspectives.com/content/6/1/2
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tion [152], have seriously misunderstood the role that sat-
isfactions of the Bradford Hill criteria play relative to causal
claims. Within an IBE framework, satisfactions of Bradford
Hill criteria do not justify asserting that a causal claim is
true. Satisfactions of the Bradford Hill criteria do not pro-
vide "a useful tool for the assessment of biomedical causa-
tion" [153], and they do not confirm the causal efficacy of
an agent (such as cancer) in the emergence of one of more
symptoms [86]. Put more generally, causal criteria, within
an IBE framework, are not, as Susser suggests, criteria in the
"pragmatic inductive/deductive approach" whose function
is to "guide the evaluation of evidence about cause" [154].
The mistake here, from the point of view of IBE, is that
these claims are attempting to place satisfactions of Brad-
ford Hill criteria in deductive or, more likely, inductive
inferences. When used in IBE, applications of Bradford Hill
criteria lead to the discovery of explanatory hypotheses
whose explanatory power, if true, is what justifies their role
as hypotheses from which further (deductive and induc-
tive) investigations should proceed.
Even more cautious claims about the role of Bradford Hill
criteria, such as that their satisfaction permits determining
whether statistical associations between exposures and
outcomes "are likely to be causal" [45], or that the use of
the criteria is useful in reviewing the evidence in support
of a causal claim [6], are likely inconsistent with the IBE
understanding. Although not explicitly stated, such stud-
ies seem to make one of two (sometimes both) underlying
assumptions. The first assumption is that satisfaction, to
some degree, of one or more of the Bradford Hill criteria
confirms the claim that a statistical association is a causal
relation, while the second assumption is that the failure of
those criteria to be falsified gives some reason for accept-
ing that a statistical association is a causal relation. This
contrasts with the IBE framework in which satisfactions of
the Bradford Hill criteria both identify a hypothesis about
a statistical association, and justify claiming that the
hypothesis that the statistical association is a causal rela-
tion is, if true, the hypothesis that best explains the avail-
able data. Steinberg and Goodwin appear to come close to
this view of the Bradford Hill criteria. They write that their
study about alcohol and breast cancer reviewed "the avail-
able evidence regarding the association of alcohol with
breast cancer" and then applied the Bradford Hill criteria
to the data "to examine the existence and nature of the
association of alcohol with breast cancer risk" [87]. If we
replace 'examine' with 'discover', and equate discovering
the nature of an association with discovering whether
treating a statistical association as a causal relation is the
best explanation of the statistical association, then we
have something reasonably close to the idea of applying
the Bradford Hill criteria in an IBE framework.
A second implication of placing the Bradford Hill criteria
in an IBE framework is that the relevant inference, with
the conclusion that the best explanation for a statistical
association is that it is a causal relation, must begin with a
body of facts (data) [142]. This is at least superficially con-
sistent with Weed's claims that the "practice of causal
inference requires a body of evidence" [155], and, with
some possible qualification depending on what Weed
means by "collected and summarized", that the criteria
"are "applied" to the available evidence after it has been
collected and summarized in a systematic narrative
review" [88]. Moreover, it seems to accord well with
Susser's claim that judgments about the presence (or
absence) of causal relations are "reached by weighing the
available evidence" [64], and with studies that apply Brad-
ford Hill criteria to collected evidence presented in
reviewed literature [73,74,81-87]. The important point
here is that the causal claim that is the conclusion of IBE
is neither a deductive nor an inductive inference from this
data, but is rather an inference in the sense that it is an
explanatory claim that, if true, makes the greatest sense of
the data. Put a bit differently, the hypothesis generated by
IBE is "justified precisely to the extent that it is shown to
have explanatory power" [156], and that explanatory
power is what is revealed by the satisfactions of the Brad-
ford Hill criteria when applied to the available data.
To reiterate though, one cannot conclude that a causal
claim inferentially supported by satisfactions within an
IBE framework is a true causal claim or that it is improba-
ble that the conclusion is false. What IBE permits is only
the conclusion that the hypothesis that the statistical asso-
ciation is a causal relation is the best possible explanation,
given the satisfactions of the Bradford Hill criteria by the
data. What the satisfactions of the Bradford Hill criteria do
is not make the causal claim true, but instead, justify the
claim that the causal claim is the one that would, if true,
be the most explanatory in light of the data to which the
criteria were applied and the satisfactions of the criteria
[136]. IBE, like Peirceian abduction from which it comes,
is, in the case of causal inference, the process of adopting
a causal claim "on probation". As noted by Curd, this
adoption "does not mean accepting the hypothesis
[causal claim] as true, or even as inductively probable, but
regarding the hypothesis as a workable conjecture, a hope-
ful suggestion which is worth taking seriously enough to
submit to a detailed exploration and testing. [157]" Con-
trary to Potischman and Weed, this means that even if all
the Bradford Hill criteria were applied to the data and all
the criteria were, to a greater or lesser degree, satisfied,
nothing would follow about whether we would be in a
"strong position to make a public health recommenda-
tion, as long as other (e.g. ethical) considerations were
also met" [105]. This sort of claim conflates the function
of IBE with induction. Unlike Harman's view of IBE
according to which all inductive inferences are subsuma-
ble under the umbrella of IBE [135], the view I am pre-
senting in this paper is that IBE is distinct from inductiveEpidemiologic Perspectives & Innovations 2009, 6:2 http://www.epi-perspectives.com/content/6/1/2
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inferences. On the other side of the inductive-deductive
dichotomy, it is also a mistake to claim that "causal crite-
ria can be used to critically test – through refutation and
prediction – causal hypotheses of necessary causes" [44].
This conflates the function of IBE with deduction. The
only logically permitted conclusion, within the IBE frame-
work, is that we have good reason for taking seriously the
hypothesis that the statistical association is a causal rela-
tion. This does not make the conclusion true or likely, or
improbable to be false; it only means that it is a hypothe-
sis that we now need to investigate further to determine
whether the statistical association really is a causal rela-
tion and what causal effect, if any, there is.
The third important consequence of placing the Bradford
Hill criteria in an IBE framework is that the relation of sat-
isfactions of the criteria to the hypothesized causal claim is
not a formal one. In contrast with deductive inferences and
the ideals of inductive inferences, there are no formal rules
of IBE. As Hanson notes, for Peirce, one of the forerunners
to Hanson's "logic of discovery" and IBE, there is no "man-
ual", no formalized set of rules, to "help scientists make dis-
coveries" about the hypotheses that best explained the data
[147]. Instead, the rules of IBE are best thought of as strate-
gies [158] to accomplish a particular goal, viz., the goal of
making explanatory sense out of the data in question,
where the "explanatory sense" in question means explana-
tions within a cause-and-effect framework. In this respect,
the inferences in IBE are somewhat different from the way
that Hanson characterized inferences in his "logic of dis-
covery". As Gutting notes [159], one of the principal objec-
tions to Hanson's "logic of discovery" as well as why, for
Gutting, Hanson's "analysis remains unfruitful" is that he
conceived of its inferences having a logical form in the
same sense that deductive and inductive inferences have a
logical form. By characterizing the rules of IBE (instantiated
by the Bradford Hill criteria) as strategies (regulative princi-
ples), one avoids the problems associated with treating
them as formal, logical rules of inference, while, using lan-
guage from Simon, retaining their "logical" status as "nor-
mative standards for judging the process used to discover"
the best explanatory hypothesis [148].
It is here that one's assumptions about the "nature" of
causes impacts the kinds of acceptable inferences to the
best explanation. If one, pace  Cartwright, believes that
"there is an untold variety of causal relations" [107], then
there will not be a single answer to what the "best" causal
explanation is. The answer will vary with the kind of cause
(or causes) in which one is interested. This fits well with a
claim already attributed to Weed that, in cancer epidemi-
ology, the most likely choices of Bradford Hill criteria to
use are "constancy, strength, dose response and biological
plausibility, leaving behind coherence, specificity, anal-
ogy and (interestingly) temporality" [131]. Moreover, this
view gives substance to Susser's claim about the intimate
connection between the use of causal criteria and the
development of a "grammar for a pragmatic epidemiol-
ogy" [154]. At the same time, this does not entail that the
"inference" in IBE is nothing but a psychological infer-
ence. Acknowledging that IBE occurs within the context of
inquiries about cause-and-effect relations whose goals
and practices are broadly delimited by psychological, soci-
ological and historical characteristics is not the same as
saying that the inferences have no logical character. IBE
still falls on the logical side of the logical/psychological
dichotomy of inferences discussed earlier in the context of
deductive and inductive inferences.
Of course, this still leaves a methodological issue unre-
solved and in need of further investigation. Even with a
particular kind or sense of cause set as part of the back-
ground framework for our inquiry, how do we "know"
whether applications of a set of criteria to the available
(and relevant) data (such as the Bradford Hill criteria)
really result in the best explanation? After all, if we had
started out with different criteria, then it is possible that
the explanation on which we settled would be a different
one. Peirce's answer to this question in the case of abduc-
tion was that the end/goal of abduction is, "through sub-
jection to the test of experiment, to lead to the avoidance
of all surprise" and to the establishment of a productive
way of interacting with the world [160]. We can tell an
analogous story about the use of Bradford Hill criteria in
IBE. What supports the use of the Bradford Hill criteria (or
some weighted subset of the criteria) in IBE two-fold.
First, the hypotheses discovered by satisfactions of the cri-
teria in IBE are testable (by use of deductive and inductive
inferences, where the concept of "test" is appropriate). If
the hypotheses were not testable, this would give good
reasons for selecting another set of criteria or differently
weighting the criteria we had been using. Second, if true,
the hypotheses discovered by satisfactions of the criteria
in IBE successfully resolve outstanding problems we have
that were the source of our inquiries into causes. Thus, the
"justification", if one wants to use that word, of using
Bradford Hill criteria in IBE is fallibilist and pragmatic. It
is not likely that this will satisfy people who want some
formal justification for using the criteria, but this kind of
pragmatic justification seems entirely appropriate and
sensitive to the different purposes that motivate our
inquires into causes. After all, within the IBE framework,
various weightings of the Bradford Hill criteria function as
"causal values", in Poole's nicely captured sense, reflecting
differing (though more or less shared) interests in making
causal claims, differing (though more or less shared) con-
cepts of cause, and differing (though more or less shared)
standards of what counts as a causal measure [161].Epidemiologic Perspectives & Innovations 2009, 6:2 http://www.epi-perspectives.com/content/6/1/2
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Conclusion
Research in epidemiology and the health sciences contin-
ues to make use of criteria such as the Bradford Hill
"aspects of association" in making causal inferences based
on observational data. The idea of much of this research is
that using satisfactions of Bradford Hill criteria justifies
the causal claims that are the conclusions of such infer-
ences. This research ranges from clinical research in pedi-
atric nephrology [162], to the relationship between "the
parenchymal pattern of the breast seen on mammo-
graphic examination and risk of breast cancer" [163], to
pharmacovigilance [164]. However, as argued above, such
research is ill served by the use of the Bradford Hill criteria
when the inferences in which they are used are either
deductive or inductive causal inferences. If correct, then
what options are available for researchers wanting to
make justified causal claims? One possibility is to accept a
variation of Russell's 1912 claim in his presidential
address to the Aristotelian Society and say that the word
'cause' is so "inextricably bound up with misleading asso-
ciations" as to make its complete extrusion from the scien-
tific vocabulary desirable [165]. A second possibility is to
say that if we want truly causal claims, then we should
restrict our attention to data from properly conducted ran-
domized controlled experimental studies. However, each
of these two conclusions is, in its own way, too Draco-
nian.
Regarding the first possibility, following Cartwright, it seems
that we need causal concepts to distinguish between effective
and non-effective strategies [166]. To use an example by
Field, although there is a high statistical correlation between
smoking and lung cancer, taking an anti-cancer drug is not
an effective strategy for quitting smoking, which suggests that
concept of cause plays a crucial role in distinguishing effec-
tive from ineffective strategies [167]. Thus, the cost of
expunging "causal talk" from the sciences would be to
undermine the practical goals of science, as well as the hope
of using the results of scientific inquiry to create beneficial
policies and help in making sound legal decisions. Regarding
the second possibility, not only would this restrict causal
claims to a very narrow range of data (excluding, for exam-
ple, studies that use survey data), it also assumes that prop-
erly conducted RCTs really do justify causal claims. However,
as discussed previously, this assumption is subject to a vari-
ety of practical and methodological difficulties [30,41,42],
not the least of which is that, as Cartwright writes, the
method of randomized controlled experiments may tell us
something about causal relations in the very specific circum-
stances of the experiment, but "tells us nothing about what
the cause does elsewhere" [107].
Rather than accepting either of the possible Draconian
conclusions, I have argued in this paper that there is an
alternative account of the role of the Bradford Hill criteria
(and of causal criteria more generally). The problems
associated with the use of causal criteria are due to sup-
posing that their satisfactions play a role in either deduc-
tive or inductive causal inferences. Given the long
tradition of dichotomizing logical inferences into deduc-
tive and inductive inferences, and supposing that the
dichotomy is an exhaustive one, this is a natural supposi-
tion. However, by acknowledging and understanding a
kind of logical inference, crucial in the "logic of discov-
ery", that is neither deductive nor inductive, and by plac-
ing applications of the Bradford Hill criteria in this
framework, the framework of inference to the best expla-
nation, we find a new and important role for the criteria.
Applications of the criteria, with a recognition that the cri-
teria may change in content or in the emphasis placed on
individual criteria depending on the conception of cause
which motivates the inquiry about causal relations, play a
crucial role in the discovery and justification of what
hypothetical causal claims merit further, detailed study.
What kind of further study is that? Part of the value of the
role of causal criteria presented in this paper is that this
question remains an open one, and that the use of causal
criteria complements many possible approaches that one
may take to the task of justifying the claim that it is true
(or false) that a statistical association is a causal relation.
Satisfactions of the Bradford Hill criteria, in the IBE frame-
work described in this paper, do not permit inferring that
a statistical association is a causal relation. Instead, such
satisfactions only justify claiming that, if true, the hypo-
thetical identification of a statistical association as a
causal relation is the best explanation supported by the
data [136,168]. Thus, satisfactions of the Bradford Hill cri-
teria in the IBE framework provide a propaedeutic to fur-
ther, statistical analyses of causal claims. As an example,
for those interested in using Bayesian methods [169,170],
the information provided by satisfactions of the Bradford
Hill criteria in an IBE framework may contribute to the
specification of the needed prior probabilities
[136,142,171]. Once applications of causal criteria in an
IBE framework present us with causal hypotheses that
merit further study, only careful and reflective analyses
using the appropriate methodological safeguards and sta-
tistical tools will lead to justified claims about the truth or
falsity of those hypotheses.
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